A new study has cast serious doubt on whether the much-ballyhooed U.S. shale oil and gas revolution has long-term staying power.
The U.S. produced 8.5 million barrels of oil per day in July of this year — 60 percent more than just three years earlier. That is also the highest rate of production in three decades.
Put another way, since 2011, the U.S. has added 3 million barrels per day in additional capacity to global supplies. Had that volume not come online, oil prices would surely be much higher than they currently are.
That has “revolutionized” the energy industry and geopolitics, as scores of energy analysts have claimed. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) forecasts that U.S. oil production will hit 9.6 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2019, and gradually decline to 7.5 million bpd by 2040.
This would allow the U.S. to be one of the world’s top oil producers for an extended period of time. With such an achievement now at hand, many analysts are predicting an era of American dominance in geopolitics. For example, in an op-ed on Oct. 20, columnist Joe Nocera considered a “world without OPEC,” in which U.S. oil production soon kills off the oil cartel.
Or consider this rather triumphalist piece in Foreign Affairs from earlier this year, where two former National Security Council members who worked under President George W. Bush boasted that the recent surge in oil production “should help put to rest declinist thinking” and “sharpen the instruments of U.S. statecraft.” In the following issue, Ed Morse of Citibank went further. “Despite its doubters and haters, the shale revolution in oil and gas production is here to stay,” he declared.
But a new report throws cold water on the thinking that U.S. shale production will be around for the long haul. The Post Carbon Institute conducted an analysis of the top seven oil and top seven natural gas plays, which together account for 89 percent of current shale oil production and 88 percent of shale gas production.
The report found that both shale oil and shale gas production will peak before 2020. More importantly, the report’s author, David Hughes, says oil production will decline much more quickly than the EIA has predicted.
That’s largely because of high decline rates at shale wells across the country. Unlike conventional wells, which can produce relatively stable rates for a long period of time, shale oil and gas wells experience an initial burst of production in the first few years, followed by a precipitous decline thereafter.
Hughes estimates that the average shale oil well declines at a rate of between 60 and 91 percent over three years. Wells in the Bakken decline by 45 percent per year, which stands in stark contrast to the 5 percent annual decline for an average conventional well.
Or put another way, oil and gas companies will have to keep drilling at a feverish pace just to stand still. This means the industry is on a “drilling treadmill” that will be unsustainable over the long-term.
Predicting what oil production will be in 25 years is difficult, to say the least, but the Post Carbon report projects that oil production from the Bakken and Eagle Ford will be just one-tenth of the level that EIA is forecasting. The EIA predicts that the Bakken and the Eagle Ford will be producing a combined 1 million bpd in 2040. Hughes thinks it will be just a small fraction of that amount – a mere 73,000 bpd.
This is not the first time that David Hughes has taken aim at EIA data. In a December 2013 report, he skewered the high estimates for the potential of the Monterrey Shale in California, calling the EIA’s numbers “simplistic and highly overstated.” Several months later, the EIA was forced to back track on its figures, downgrading the recoverable oil estimates in the Monterrey by 96 percent.
Hughes says the implications of getting it wrong are “profound,” since so many companies are basing very large investments on incorrect projections. He says rosy estimates have cut into investment for renewables, while steering capital towards expensive oil and gas export terminals that should now be called into question.
An article in CleanTechnica points to the possibility of boom towns turning into “ghost towns” if the pace of drilling drops off. If David Hughes and The Post Carbon Institute are correct, there could be quite a few ghost towns popping up in the coming years as the shale revolution begins to fizzle.
Source and Full Report Here
The Utica Shale contains about 38 trillion cubic feet of undiscovered, technically recoverable natural gas (at the mean estimate) according to the first assessment of this continuous (unconventional) natural gas accumulation by the U. S. Geological Survey.
The Utica Shale has a mean of 940 million barrels of unconventional oil resources and a mean of 9 million barrels of unconventional natural gas liquids.
The Utica Shale lies beneath the Marcellus Shale, and both are part of the Appalachian Basin, which is the longest-producing petroleum province in the United States. The Marcellus Shale, at 84 TCF of natural gas, is the largest unconventional gas basin USGS has assessed. This is followed closely by the Greater Green River Basin in southwestern Wyoming, which has 84 TCF of undiscovered natural gas, of which 82 TCF is continuous (tight gas).
“Understanding our domestic oil and gas resource potential is important, which is why we assess emerging plays like the Utica, as well as areas that have been in production for some time” said Brenda Pierce, USGS Energy Resources Program Coordinator. “Publicly available information about undiscovered oil and gas resources can aid policy makers and resource managers, and inform the debate about resource development.”
The Utica Shale assessment covered areas in Maryland, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia.
Some shale rock formations, like the Utica and Marcellus, can be source rocks – those formations from which hydrocarbons, such as oil and gas, originate. Conventional oil and gas resources gradually migrate away from the source rock into other formations and traps, whereas continuous resources, such as shale oil and shale gas, remain trapped within the original source rock.
These new estimates are for technically recoverable oil and gas resources, which are those quantities of oil and gas producible using currently available technology and industry practices, regardless of economic or accessibility considerations.
This USGS assessment is an estimate of continuous oil, gas, and natural gas liquid accumulations in the Upper Ordovician Utica Shale of the Appalachian Basin. The estimate of undiscovered oil ranges from 590 million barrels to 1.39 billion barrels (95 percent to 5 percent probability, respectively), natural gas ranges from 21 to 61 TCF (95 percent to 5 percent probability, respectively), and the estimate of natural gas liquids ranges from 4 to 16 million barrels (95 percent to 5 percent probability, respectively).
USGS is the only provider of publicly available estimates of undiscovered technically recoverable oil and gas resources of onshore lands and offshore state waters. The USGS Utica Shale assessment was undertaken as part of a nationwide project assessing domestic petroleum basins using standardized methodology and protocol.
The gas fields extend from the booming Eagle Ford play of South Texas deep into the ranch and coal country stretching inland from this violent border city. This is Zetas country, among the most fearsome of Mexico’s criminal badlands.
U.S. and Mexican energy companies long have been besieged by the gangsters here – their workers assaulted, extorted or murdered – despite a heavy military and federal police presence. Now, with feuding Zetas factions bloodying one another and fending off outside rivals, what has been a bad situation threatens to get much worse.
Northern Mexico’s gas production has suffered for years as gangland threats or attacks have kept workers from servicing the wellheads, pipelines and drilling rigs in the Burgos Basin, the territory between the Rio Grande and the city of Monterrey, which now provides up to 20 percent of Mexico’s natural gas.
“Petroleos Mexicanos has problems with security … principally in Burgos,” Guillermo Dominguez, a senior member of the National Hydrocarbons Commission, told the Mexico City newspaper Reforma.
And now the surging Zetas bloodletting pits the gang’s top bosses – Heriberto Lazcano and Miguel Angel Treviño – against Ivan Velazquez, a former underling known as “El Taliban.” From his base in the western state of Zacatecas, Velazquez reportedly has allied with the remnants of other gangs to launch a challenge for control of Coahuila state, which holds most of the shale gas reserves.
Challenge to control
Banners recently hung by both Zetas factions have accused one another of treason and other transgressions that will be avenged with death. Fighting has rattled Nuevo Laredo, the Zetas stronghold that also is the busiest land port for U.S.-Mexico trade, killing scores this month alone.
Still more banners appeared in Nuevo Laredo Tuesday, reputedly written by beleaguered civilians, promising all the gangster factions further bloody vengeance.
“Zetas are pretty much in control, but they have been challenged,” said a U.S. official in Mexico who monitors the situation, speaking on condition of anonymity. “You have all these groups fighting one another, shifting alliances and internal fights … It’s a wilderness of mirrors.”
The Zetas’ spats with rivals already have turned Coahuila’s other large cities – Torreon in the west, Monclova in the center and Saltillo in the east – into fierce gangland battlegrounds. State officials are blaming the Sept. 17 escape of 131 prisoners from a Piedras Negras prison on the Zetas seeking to replenish their ranks for new battles.
The insecurity in Mexico’s gas fields contrasts sharply with the drilling and production frenzy seizing the ranchlands just north of the border. Oil field pickups and semi-trailer fuel tankers choke Highway 83, the once-desolate ranch-country highway that cuts northwest from Laredo though the lower reaches of the Eagle Ford.
Some 6,000 drilling permits have been issued for Eagle Ford shale in Texas, and 550 wells are producing there. By comparison, Pemex so far has drilled five exploratory shale gas wells, but hopes to drill 170 more in the next four years. The company plans to spend $200 million on exploration in the short term.
Those first exploratory wells have been drilled to the west of Nuevo Laredo and below the border at Piedras Negras, ranch and coal country that remains relatively violence free for now. But that tranquility may owe more to the now-threatened dominance of the Zetas bosses than to rule of law.
“They are in control,” said a U.S. official. “They are pretty much just doing their thing.”
At least eight Pemex and contract employees vanished in May 2010 near a gas facility near Falcon Lake, territory under the Zetas’ firm control. Last March, two men working for a Mexican company doing contract work for Houston-based Halliburton disappeared outside Piedras Negras.
Halliburton spokeswoman Tara Mullee-Agard said employees get regular security briefings, but the company declined to comment on the contractors’ disappearance.
“Many companies that were active in the areas have stopped until Pemex or the government can provide security,” said an employee of one Reynosa-based company. “In places where there have been incidents we don’t operate anymore. When darkness falls, we stop wherever we are.
- Zetas crimping gas industry in northern Mexico (mysanantonio.com)
- Banners claim an alliance has been formed against the Zetas (mysanantonio.com)
- Mexico: State Officials Killed in Nuevo Laredo (hispanicallyspeakingnews.com)
- Piedras Negras “megafuga” just the latest massive prison break (mysanantonio.com)
- 132 inmates escape from Mexican prison near U.S. border (theprovince.com)
(Reuters) – Britain sent a clear signal of support to its oil and gas industry when it named an advocate of shale gas fracking as environment minister and a wind farm sceptic as energy minister.
The appointments in Prime Minister David Cameron‘s ministerial reshuffle on Tuesday mark a departure from his pledge to run Britain’s greenest government, in favour of the fossil fuel sector that generates billions of pounds in tax revenue.
“There is a shift away from greener ministers in posts towards less green ministers and I think that’s serious,” Alan Whitehead, a member of the Energy and Climate Change Select Committee, said during an industry event on Tuesday.The government last year put a brake on the development of shale gas extraction due to environmental concerns after it triggered two small earthquakes near Blackpool.
But Owen Paterson, a member of Cameron’s Conservative Party who was appointed Environment Secretary in the reshuffle, has hailed the potential economic benefits of shale gas, a message likely to sway the country’s decision in favour of the drilling method.
“If developed safely and responsibly, shale gas could generate massive economic activity and a wealth of new jobs,” Paterson said in May, when he was Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
He said huge shale gas deposits in Northern Ireland could be exploitable, adding that discoveries in the United States had shrunk its gas price to a quarter of British levels.
“(Shale gas) has also ended America’s dependence on unreliable and dictatorial regimes,” he said.
The decision on whether Britain will resume shale gas fracking, a method of drilling through shale deposits to retrieve gas by injecting liquids and chemical, is in the hands of the energy ministry, but support from the Department for Environment could speed up a decision.
NEW ENERGY MINISTER
John Hayes replaced Charles Hendry as Energy Minister in the reshuffle.
In his final media interview as Energy Minister, Hendry said a decision on shale gas was not imminent, but that Britain could not ignore its impact on the U.S. energy market.
Hayes has been a vocal opponent of wind farms, a technology the government regards as key to meeting climate change goals.
“Such tall structures will have a detrimental impact on the quality of life for local residents, the attractiveness of the area and its potential for tourism,” Hayes said at a local council meeting, reflecting the views of his constituents campaigning against the construction of a wind farm.
He said wind farms would always be backed up by conventional power plants because of their unreliability and that they had a detrimental impact on wildlife.
“Wind power (considerably) increases the average household energy bills as the profit-hungry energy companies continue to chase the taxpayer funded subsidies and credits,” the new Energy Minister said.
(Reporting by Karolin Schaps; Additional reporting by Susanna Twidale; Editing by David Cowell)
- Pennsylvania’s Booming Shale Gas Energy Industry (tarpon.wordpress.com)
A report published by Baker & McKenzie has said that last year the US government approved exports from a second terminal, and decisions on eight other applications for export approval are expected later this year.
Implications for Japanese LNG buyers and investors
The report stressed that expanded U.S. LNG exports represents an opportunity not only for Japanese LNG buyers to diversify their supply sources with shale gas but also at more competitive pricing linked to Henry Hub prices rather than oil prices. Japanese companies also could establish value chains in the U.S. by investing in projects to build export facilities and by acquiring interests in shale gas fields.
Since 1967 the Kenai LNG Plant in Alaska, which produced all eight of the LNG cargoes shipped from the U.S. to Japan in 2011, had been the only LNG plant with export approval. This changed last year when the Sabine Pass facility in Louisiana obtained export approval. Eight other applications for export approval are now pending.
Export approval process and outlook
Under the Natural Gas Act gas exports require permission from the federal government. Such permission is only granted if the Department of Energy (DOE) determines that the proposed exports are consistent with the public interest. Exports to 17 countries which have free trade agreements (FTAs) with the U.S. are deemed consistent with the public interest and the DOE must approve exports to these countries “without modification or delay”. In contrast, approvals for exports to non-FTA countries, including Japan, are subject to a lengthy public interest finding process which allows for comments, protests, and motions to intervene from interested parties.
The applicable legislation does not require the DOE to take action on applications within a certain timeframe. After Sabine Pass received approval for exports to non-FTA countries in May last year, the DOE suspended consideration of all applications pending the results of a study on the impact of exports on the domestic energy market. This followed complaints from some U.S. lawmakers who were concerned that exports might increase domestic prices. The domestic market impact study was initially scheduled to be completed by the first quarter of this year, but it is still pending and is now expected to be completed later this summer. Accordingly, none of the pending applications are likely to be approved until the fourth quarter of this year at the earliest.
There are, however, some reasons to believe there is political support for expanding LNG exports to non-FTA countries such as Japan. For example, on July 2, 2012, a bipartisan group of 21 members of Congress from states with shale gas deposits sent a letter to Energy Secretary Steven Chu urging the DOE to expedite the pending LNG export applications. In February, Secretary Chu said he supports LNG exports, and Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda also said he discussed expanding LNG exports when he met with President Barack Obama on April 30, 2012.
Actions to consider
• Conduct preliminary due diligence on LNG projects with pending non-FTA export approval applications, as these projects are likely to be now seeking LNG buyers and equity investors.
• Monitor the DOE’s non-FTA export approval process.
• Investigate the compatibility of LNG produced from U.S. shale gas with regasification facilities and pipeline networks in Japan
Given the currently wide differential between the Henry Hub spot price used for trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and JCC pricing, expanded LNG exports produced from U.S. shale gas fields is a potential game changer for the gas market in Northeast Asia, and Japan in particular. From the Japanese buyer’s perspective, it is clear that approvals for further export terminals is an important development to monitor in order to position themselves as potential buyers and equity investors. For more information, please contact Colin Cook or Hiromitsu Kato.
Source: Baker & McKenzie via: Source
- Japan LNG Demand on the Rise, Looks to Secure US Export Contracts (gcaptain.com)
- It’s a Ridiculously Good Year to Own an LNG Ship [REPORT] (gcaptain.com)
As the unconventional gas “revolution” was quietly unfolding in the United States, its potential to transform the U.S. gas market, and the country’s national energy discourse, was not apparent until recently. It has now become clear that shale gas development is perhaps the biggest energy sector innovation for the United States in recent decades. For Europe, however, the role shale gas will play in transforming energy markets is far from certain. The old continent’s unconventional gas reserves are substantial, but the question is how fast and to what extent Europe will develop them.
Europe needs a clear roadmap for the prospects of unconventional gas in its energy future. The current situation calls for an approach that is based on realistic expectations about the pace of shale gas development, as well as a strategy that is well-informed about potential costs and benefits. Continuing uncertainty could not only hamper the flow of investment into potential unconventional gas reserves, but could also impede the development of informed plans about Europe’s energy security and ability to fight climate change.
To begin with, it is worth recognizing Europe’s limitations. The combination of factors that led to the unconventional gas “revolution” in the United States—favorable geology, developed gas markets, and until recently, limited regulatory and public constraints—is not easy to replicate. Geologically, knowledge of unconventional gas in Europe does not go much beyond rough estimates. Where exactly are the shale deposits located? At what depth? And in what type of formations? At what cost could they be extracted? Europe still needs to start mapping out its shale gas reserves—a process that started almost three decades ago in the United States. At this point all that is known is that there are sufficient reserves to transform Europe’s gas market. Estimates vary but they consistently put the European Union’s unconventional reserves well above its conventional ones. Knowing this alone, however, is not enough.
The cost of developing shale gas reserves will be a principal factor in determining the future of unconventional gas in Europe. The sharp growth in shale gas output in the United States owes much to the considerable cost reduction witnessed over the past decades. Europe stands at the beginning of that process. Lack of comprehensive geological knowledge about shale precludes a precise estimate, though costs are expected to be high not least because of the scattered nature of reserves in Europe. The absence of a vibrant services sector for the gas market presents another bottleneck. The European gas sector’s limited capacity to provide cost-effective equipment for shale gas development along with a shortage of qualified labor will undoubtedly lead to higher development costs than in the United States. Costs can certainly go down, just like they did in the United States, as the industry gradually reacts to the needs of the market. But initial costs will pose a challenge.
In its quiet “revolution,” America’s unconventional gas industry outpaced both the regulators and the public. By the time stringent environmental demands became part of the national energy discourse, unconventional gas had already assumed its transformative role in the U.S. gas sector.
In Europe, if this revolution is ever to be repeated, it will not be a quiet one. The rigorous environmental regulations that are already in place—particularly with regard to water use—are prompting investors to think twice about managing costs before they commit. With their high population density, many European governments are less willing to embrace shale gas before its environmental impacts become apparent. In many countries, particularly in Western Europe, governments ignore environmental movements at their own peril. More investment in shale development will almost certainly have to confront calls for even stricter ecological requirements.
The EU’s energy and climate policy needs to recognize these constraints. It would be unrealistic to expect shale gas to be a panacea for the Union’s growing concerns on energy security and climate mitigation. This is true at least in the short and medium term.
And yet, discounting the potential role of unconventional gas in Europe’s future would be a mistake. It is in the EU’s long-term interest to maintain a role for shale gas development. Most industry insiders argue that unconventional gas will not contribute in any significant form to Europe’s energy supply until at least the end of this decade. Its role beyond that point, however, is anyone’s guess. How fast Europe develops these resources depends on today’s policy choices.
European policymakers should give shale gas development a chance. First, as a latecomer compared to the United States, Europe is more likely to find a way to develop its unconventional resources in an environmentally friendly fashion. Stricter regulations and low public tolerance for potential environmental risks may slow the pace of shale gas development. They can, however, also ensure that Europe develops these resources in the right way, avoiding some of the mistakes witnessed in America.
Second, the benefits of shale gas development could be disproportionately large. European gas supplies are in decline, while demand is expected to continue to grow. The EU’s ever growing need for imported gas is compounded by its dependence on a rather small number of external suppliers—Russia, Norway, and Algeria account for nearly three quarters of Europe’s imports. It is not certain that unconventional gas can reverse the decline in domestic gas output. However, it could certainly enhance the position of European importers when bargaining with their limited number of suppliers. Most recently, gas sold at spot markets, which constitutes only a fraction of total gas imports in Europe, effectively served such a role. Even Gazprom, known for its firm bargaining position, felt the need to revise a portion of its contracts. Shale gas could play a similar role for European importers in the future by enhancing competition. Increased liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports could potentially have a similar impact. But, they will be need to be sourced from outside the EU, maintaining Europe’s dependence on global LNG market trends.
Even if unconventional gas is not a “game changer” for Europe as a whole, it could be a “game changer” for a select group of EU members. Ironically, some of the countries with greater prospects for shale gas development—Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria—are among the most dependent on Russian gas.
At this point, the future of shale gas in Europe is very much in the hands of national governments. Legal competence for hydrocarbon development is mainly within the domain of these governments rather than Brussels. What they need is a well-informed national discourse on unconventional gas that involves all the main stakeholders. In effect, they need to avoid what France recently did—a rushed decision outlawing hydraulic fracturing—and instead attempt to fully assess the potential for developing shale gas while complying with strict environmental standards.
Brussels, on the other hand, does have a role to play. In addition to ensuring higher environmental standards, it could attempt to bring greater clarity about the future of natural gas in Europe’s energy balance. Mixed signals about its expected role have understandably preoccupied investors. Also, it could elaborate investment mechanisms for shale gas development that would serve its long-term decarbonization objectives by displacing more carbon-intensive sources of energy. Ultimately, Brussels should make certain that Europe does not miss this opportunity to seize the strategic potential offered by unconventional gas.
- Poland detains 7 suspected of shale gas corruption (reuters.com)
- IEA to make shale gas regulatory recommendations (business.financialpost.com)
- Shale boom in Europe fades as Polish wells come up empty (business.financialpost.com)
- Fracking could bring UK 50,000 jobs, says Browne (independent.co.uk)